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Terrorism and the
Laws of War©
ALFRED P. RUBIN'
I. INTRODUCTION
In days when the world seemed simpler, international law was neatly
divided into the law of peace and the law of war.1 Even Grotius' great
work is so divided. Modern perceptions seem to have been solidified by
the common practice of scholars to follow Grotius's example.' But the
neat classifications of lawyers have never meshed with reality, and reality
has always been victorious in the end.
The Roman religious practice of declaring war to mark the shift from
the law of peace to the law of war has always appealed to lawyers more
01983 by Alfred P. Rubin
*M. Litt, University of Cambridge; J.D., Columbia University; Charles H. Stockton Pro-
fessor of International Law, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 1981-1982; Professor of In-
ternational Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Chairman-Rapporteur, Com-
mittee on International Terrorism, International Law Association. This paper was originally
delivered at a conference on the Laws of War held at the Naval War College. The views of
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1. Inter bellum et pacem nihil est medium ("between war and peace there is no other
category.") GROTIus, DE JuRE BELLI AC PACIS III, xxi, 1 (1625). This dictum was taken from
Cicero's 8th Philippic Against Anthony. It was not intended to mean that the law of war
applied only when war had been legally declared against a recognized enemy. Cf. id. at iii, 6,
where it is made clear that war can begin without declaration since an attack is equivalent
in the law of nature to a declaration under international law. In fact, Cicero's assertion
relates to Roman religious practice and moral imperatives, not to the legal regime of the law
of war at all. Cf. CICERO, DE OFFICIS, I, xi, 36-37 (44 B.C.). The details of the religious
practice are set out in I Livy, THE EARLY HiSTORY OF RoME 32, 69-71 (ca. 27 B.C., de Se-
lincourt trans. 1960). The religious practice was more or less abandoned by the end of the
first century A.D. Dio CHRYSOSTOM, DiscounsEs 67 (Discourse 38, To the Nicomedians, c. 97
A.D.) (Loeb Classical Library 1956): "while peace is proclaimed by heralds, wars for the
most part take place unheralded." There can be little doubt that the law of war was con-
ceived to apply in both Roman and Grotian days by operation of the law of nature whenever
there was an armed contention between pretenders to public authority deriving from some
such authority a license to kill people and destroy property. Publicists' attempts to restrict
the application of the law of war to armed contentions between recognized "states" or some
other narrow class of acceptable opponents uniformly failed to have practical effect; and
failed also to have legal effect outside the legal system of the law-asserting authority. For a
more recent example of such a failed attempt, see the American Civil War cases cited in
note 25 infra.
2. The two volumes of Lauterpacht's last versions of L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, are titled, respectively, PE.ACE (8th ed. 1955) and DisPuTEs, WAR AND NEuTRALrrv (7th
ed. 1952); John Westlake's precursor text to Oppenheim is also in two volumes, PEACE
(1904) and WAR (1907).
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than to military men or statesmen.3 It has been repeatedly suggested in
modern times that the supposed sharp theoretical distinction between the
law of peace and the law of war, with all its complex exceptions, is more
deceptive than helpful in analyzing international law, which grows from
state practice and diplomatic correspondence.' The importance of re-
analyzing the relationship between the law of war and the law of peace
has provoked the most resistance from those who perceive virtues in rigid
classification of the law when discussing "terrorism."'
Attaching the label "terrorist" or "soldier" to an individual engaged
in violence for what he considers to be a public purpose is in the first
instance a political as well as a legal act. As has been the case with regard
to recognition of statehood or governments, recognition of "belligerency"
is frequently denied for political reasons, but recognized by implication
when the legal results of recognition are sought by states who simultane-
ously deny the overt label.' Thus, "terrorists" may be labeled "criminals"
while in fact treated as "prisoners of war" when captured by a state deny-
ing that the law of war applies even to that particular outbreak of politi-
cal violence.
It is the purpose of this paper to examine the evolution of the cur-
rent law relating to "irregular" combatants, particularly their entitlement
or lack of entitlement to treatment as "prisoners of war" under the law of
war. The discussion to follow is an attempt to clarify the underlying per-
ceptions of law as they appear to have been growing, in disregard of the
dicta of Cicero, by analyzing the refusals to label some irregulars as lawful
combatants and the treatment actually accorded to them in several cases.
II. FORMAL POW STATUS; RULES
There has been a peculiar twist in the formal designation of persons
who should be treated as prisoners of war since the earliest days of the
movement towards codification of the laws of war. In the Lieber Code,7
3. America's first formal war was fought against France from 1798-1800 without any
declarations but with the belligerent law of "prize" being applied by American courts at
Congress's direction in order to make "legal" the capture of French ships by American pri-
vateers. See Statute of 9 July, 1798, ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578, §§ 1, 2 & 5.
4. F. GROB, Ti RELATivrrY OF WAR AND PEACE (1949); Jessup, Should Inter-national
Law Recognize an Intermediate Status between War and Peace? 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 98
k19541;) Laumltaln I,, n Cu., .uua ." .c.c , , -jZ Cf. 1. ~~t - . .1
L. 58 (1968); Rubin, Sunken Soviet Submarines and Central Intelligence; Laws of Property
and the Agency, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 855 (1975); Norton, Between the Ideology and The
Reality: The Shadow of the Law of Neutrality, 17 HARv. INr'L L.J. 249 (1976).
5. See, e.g., remarks of Professor William O'Brien in 74 PRoc. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 206
(1980) and Reply by Professor Rubin, id. at 209; Dissent by L.C. Green and J.J. Lador-
Lederer, 4th Interim Report, INr'L LAw A. COMM. ON INT'L TERRORiSM 8-11 (1982).
6. This was done by the United States with regard to the undoubted government of the
People's Republic of China in Beijing from 1949 until President Nixon made a formal state
visit in 1972. The legal and political threads are definitively disentangled in Kelsen, Recog-
nition in International Law, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 604 (1941).
7. Promulgated as General Orders No. 100 issued by President Lincoln to the Union
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articles 49-518 define those persons who should be given prisoner of war
status. Generally, the status should apply to soldiers, civilians accompa-
nying the forces, such as newsmen and contractor personnel, and civilians
who are part of a levee en masses in a section of the country not subject
to military occupation. All others are mere brigands. Under article 82,
squads of men who "commit hostilities ... without commission, without
being part and portion of the organized hostile army, and without sharing
continuously in the war" are to be given motivation.10 The fundamental
distinction is between full-time soldiers and those integrally involved in
their operations on the one side, and full-time civilians on the other.
Those seeking to occupy an intermediate position blur the distinction and
need not be accorded soldiers' privileges under the Lieber Code.
The Brussels Declaration of 187411 maintained the same distinction
and added two more qualifications which further restrict the definition of
those captives to be treated as honorable prisoners of war. Article 9 ex-
tends soldiers' privileges to "militia and volunteer corps," and although it
does not expressly require that members of such corps be full-time
soldiers, it does require that those considered for soldiers' privileges
"carry arms openly" and that "they conduct their operations in accor-
dance with the laws and customs of war." Article 10 extends the same
privileges to members of lev~es en masse "if they respect the laws and
customs of war."! 12 Since "respect" for the laws and customs of war seems
Army of the United States, Apr. 24, 1863 [hereinafter cited as the Lieber Code], reprinted
in D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, 3-23 (2d rev. & comp. ed.
1981). Formally issued as Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in
the Field, the code of 157 articles was drafted by Professor Francis Lieber of Columbia
University and revised by an Army board chaired by General Halleck, a respected interna-
tional legal scholar as well as Army Chief of Staff. See Root, Francis Lieber, 7 Am. J. INr'L
L. 453 (1913).
8. Lieber Code, supra note 7, acts 49-51.
9. Levkes en masse are groups of civilians authorized by their government to assume
the duties of soldiers and who act as such without the formal status of army membership.
The protected status of levbes en masse has been recognized in European practice of the
eighteenth century and later. A particularly famous instance involved the citizen army of
France repelling the general European onslaught of 1793. See W.E. HALL, A TREATISE ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 535-42 (4th ed. 1895). On the French call to arms of August 23, 1793,
see II T. CARLYLE, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, Ch. VI, 296-97 (1837) (American ed. by Bel-
ford, Clarke & Co., n.d.). The legal position of the Massachusetts Minutemen of 1775 might
properly be classified as a response to a similar call from the "shadow government" headed
by John Hancock, Samuel Adams, and their friends.
10. Lieber Code, art. 82; reprinted in D. SCHINDLER & J. ToMAN, supra note 7, at 14.
11. The Brussels Declaration of 1874 was contained in a Russian draft submitted by
Czar Alexander to a European conference of fifteen states, which adopted the draft with
minor alterations. It was never adopted formally, but was an important intellectual link
between the Lieber Code, which had been adopted as municipal law in the United States
only, and the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907. See also D. SCHINDLER & J. ToMAw,
supra note 7, at 25, for a description and text; W.E. HALL, supra note 9, at 544-46 describes
some of the negotiations at Brussels pertinent to this subject.
12. Brussels Declaration of 1874, arts. 9-10, reprinted in D. SCHINDLER & J. ToMAN,
supra note 8, at 27-29.
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to require less than conducting "operations in accordance with" the laws
and customs of war, and the requirement of carrying arms openly appears
in article 9 but not in article 10, it appears that a door was opened in
1874 to the possibility that some partisans might be considered entitled
to soldiers' privileges and that the rigid 1863 distinction between soldiers
and civilians was being eroded.
Hall summarizes the results of the Brussels discussions on this point
as follows:
The possession of belligerent privilege ... hinges upon subordina-
tion to a responsible person, who by his local prominence, coupled
with the fact that he is obeyed by a large force, shows that he can
cause the laws of war to be observed, and that he can punish isolated
infractions of them if necessary. 13
The Brussels formulations were incorporated more or less verbatim
in articles 1 and 2 of the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907.' The one
significant change is that the 1907 text of article 2, relating to lev~es en
masse, reintroduces the requirement that arms be carried openly, thus
closing to some degree the door that the Brussels Declaration of 1874 had
opened in favor of some partisans."' Article 1 of the 1929 Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War' s incorporates the
1907 Hague provisions by simple reference.
Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War (1949 Geneva POW Convention) reorganizes the
Hague formulation and expands it considerably. It grants soldiers' privi-
leges, including prisoner of war status, to members of regular armed
forces even when they "profess allegiance to a government or an authority
not recognized by the Detaining Power,' 1 7 regardless of whether those
forces carry out their operations in accordance with the laws and customs
of war. The provisions regarding "carrying arms openly" and "conducting
13. W.E. HALL, supra note 9, at 546.
14. Regulations Annexed to the Conventions With Respect to the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403; and Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 227, T.S.
No. 539 [hereinafter cited respectively as 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations], reprinted in
D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 69.
15. Article 2 reads in pertinent part:
The population of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the
enemy's approach, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops
without having time to organize themselves in accordance with article 1, shall
be regarded as belligerents[,] if they carry arms openly and if they respect the
laws and customs of war.
1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 8, art. 2. The italicized portions were added in 1907,
and the comma in brackets was deleted.
16. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, art. 1, 47
Stat. 2021, T.S. No. 846, 118 L.N.T.S. 343 (entered into force June 19, 1931).
17. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
4(A)(3), 6 U.S.T. 316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, [hereinafter cited as 1949 Geneva
POW Convention].
VOL. 12:2-3
THE LAWS OF WAR
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war" are retained
for members of militias and other volunteer corps. Levees en masse re-
main within the conception of soldiers for purposes of prisoner of war
status, subject only to the 1907 Hague Regulations restrictions regarding
carrying arms openly and "respect" for the laws and customs of war.1'
Since article 4 of the Convention applies only to international armed con-
flicts (and not to "armed conflicts not of an international character"),1'
the extension of prisoner of war status to rebels is not normally consid-
ered to be encompassed by the extension of that status to members of the
regular armed forces of unrecognized authorities.
It is ironic that a captured member of a regular armed force is ac-
corded prisoner of war status regardless of crimes committed by the cap-
tive, either as an individual or as a matter of policy by his commanders
(such as engaging in prohibited chemical warfare), while captured par-
tisans, "freedom fighters" or "terrorists" engaged in a domestic conflict,
or armed conflict not of an international character, are denied prisoner of
war status no matter how scrupulously they as individuals and as an or-
ganized force adhere to the humanitarian laws and customs of war.
To fit the most legally troublesome, current sort of political violence
into the pattern of the 1949 Geneva Conventions it would seem that the
key step would be the Detaining Power's (typically, the defending govern-
ment's) acceptance of the conflict as an armed conflict of international
character. If that were done, individual liability for war crimes and "grave
breaches" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 0 would be applied to prison-
18. Id.
19. Id. Article 2 states that the Convention "shall apply in all cases of declared war or
of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties ...." which, under article 139, may include "any Power" acceding to it. Under
general international law, a party to a multilateral convention may refuse to recognize the
legal efficacy of a purported accession by a "Power" it does not recognize. The closest to an
incisive discussion of this conclusion, which rests primarily on a perception of the function
of recognition and consent in the international legal order, is found in the advisory opinion
of the International Court of Justice on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, 1951
I.C.J. 15 (Advisory Opinion of May 28, 1951) (Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Guer-
rero and Judges McNair, Read, Hsu Mo at 20).
Article 3 provides some minimal humanitarian obligations, not including prisoner of
war treatment, for Parties to the Convention detaining surrendered combatants in the case
of "armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties." The basis for distinguishing in 1949 between international and
noninternational armed conflicts for the purpose of determining humanitarian rules of law
appropriate to any armed conflict is not self-evident and has been increasingly criticized.
See INT'L L. Ass'N (American Branch), Proceedings and Committee Reports 1979-1980, Re-
port of the Committee on Armed Conflict 38 (1980).
20. Each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions contains provisions defining some egre-
gious acts as so far beyond the scope of soldiers' privileges that they can be called "grave
breaches" of the Conventions themselves. These acts trigger obligations in the Parties to
search for persons alleged to have committed such grave breaches, then to try or extradite
them for trial to another concerned party. Articles 129 and 130 of the 1949 Geneva POW
Convention list some "grave breaches" against prisoners of war-
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ers, while honorable partisans, "freedom fighters" and "terrorists", who
observe the laws and customs of war would be given the treatment pro-
vided for prisoners of war under the 1949 Geneva POW Convention. That
was surely the intention of those drafting the Convention in providing for
that status regardless of the Detaining Power's refusal to "recognize" the
government or authority to which the prisoners profess allegiance.
The pattern for applying the law of war to internal armed conflicts
while withholding recognition of the governmental authority of the rebel
leadership traces back in modern times to the earliest codification and to
the American Civil War.21 The dividing line, however, is frequently un-
clear between rebel leadership so highly organized that it borders on bad
faith not to accept its legal capacity to engage in belligerency, and rebel
leadership that is merely a cabal of malcontents attempting to redistrib-
ute wealth by robbing banks and keeping the spoils.22 In these circum-
stances, the defending government cannot be faulted for using the tools
the law makes available to it by withholding that recognition.2"
There are some inhibitions on abuse of this discretion. For example,
if the defending government wants to exercise belligerent rights against
willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments,
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling
a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or willfully depriv-
ing a prisoner of war the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this
Convention.
"Grave breaches" do not exhaust the list of war crimes. Any soldier exceeding his privi-
leges may be guilty of a war crime and subject to arrest, trial or extradition and punishment
under general international law and other treaties even if his acts do not amount to a grave
breach of any of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions are: I. Convention For the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; II. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; III. 1949 Geneva POW Convention, note 17
supra; IV. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
21. The Lieber Code, supra note 7, art. 152, refers to the time "when humanity induces
the adoption of the rules of regular war toward rebels" and denies that such adoption im-
plies a recognition of any governmental status in the rebel leadership. Article 154 of the
Lieber Code envisages trying the rebel leaders for treason. In practice, the U.S. military
asserted the belligerent right of blockade in 1861 before Congress had legislated the
equivalent of a declaration of war, and the Supreme Court narrowly upheld the legal power
of the Executive Branch to do so, primarily on the ground that facts determined true legal
relationships, not the forms of law. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 632 (1862). This
is not the place to repeat the Court's analysis nor to subject it to criticism.
22. This is not to suggest that the legal status of the armed conflict should be deter-
mined by the military prowess and degree of central organization in the belligerent parties.
Many other factors might be legally significant, such as the depth of political feeling in-
volved and the degree to which it makes political sense to apply any other regime of law to
the situation.
23. A more elaborate legal argument leading to this conclusion may be found in Rubin,
The Status of Rebels Under the Geneva Convention of 1949, 21 Ir'L & Comp. L.Q. 472
(1972).
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neutrals, such as the right to interdict contraband in a neutral vessel on
the high seas, it must concede a status of belligerency to its enemy in
order to claim belligerent rights for itself. This was one of the reasons
why the federal government of the United States conceded belligerent
status to the Confederate States' armies and navies in the earliest days of
the American Civil War. The neutral involved was Great Britain and dip-
lomatic correspondence between the U.S. federal authorities and the lead-
ers of the British Government held great political as well as legal signifi-
cance to the United States.2' Another example is the diplomatic isolation
and the practical difficulties of negotiating an end to the hostilities with
an "unrecognized" enemy when it is perceived that absolute victory is
unattainable.
III. FORMAL POW STATUS; MODERN PRACTICE
But those situations are rare today. Once a state has denied belliger-
ent status to armed "terrorists" who obey the laws and customs of war, it
becomes difficult, from a political perspective, to later reverse that classi-
fication. To do so implies that the "terrorists" have achieved a degree of
success warranting a change in legal classification. Whatever may be the
truth of that perception to a neutral observer, it is likely to be a truth
that must be denied by the defending government for internal political
and morale reasons. The result in practice is the adamant insistence by
governments upon a system of labeling which makes it impossible to cross
the threshold between noninternational and international armed conflicts.
This is so regardless of the degree to which the rebels might have
achieved control over territory once part of the state ruled by the defend-
ing government, and regardless of the rebels' adherence to the laws and
customs of war in their operations. This political labeling process results
in the defending government being permitted to deny soldiers' privileges
to the "terrorists," while asserting special "police" privileges (but not
soldiers' privileges under "martial law") to its own military forces. By de-
nying the applicability of international law, and asserting the exclusive
applicability of its own internal law, adjusted with 'emergency' provisions
and special tribunals and prisons, an assymetry of legal status is
achieved.25 The resulting situation may be analogized to a military force
composed entirely of a posse of ad hoc deputy sheriffs chasing criminals.
"Terrorists" are tried for "murder" instead of the war crime of killing
civilians outside the reach of the soldier's privilege, and are imprisoned
for an arbitrary number of years as members of an "illegal organization,"
instead of being detained for the duration of the conflict because of their
24. J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 626-30, 768-69 (1906).
25. "Symmetry," in this context, refers to the two or more parties to the conflict being
equal before the law. "Assymetry" is the situation in which one side or another asserts that
its legal system dominates the situation; for example, one's forces are entitled to the privi-
leges of belligerents while the forces on the other side are criminals under municipal law,
subject to extradition if they reach third countries.
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participation." The legal status of defending government forces and "ter-
rorists" is thus asymmetrical. The status of "international armed con-
flict", which is the threshold at which a symmetry of legal status is
achieved and all combatants are treated alike under the law, is reached, if
it is reached at all, too late to affect the tactics of the struggle.
That, in turn, must encourage the irregulars to ignore the laws and
customs of war, and to go to any extreme to escape capture. Further, in
reprisal, captured regulars of the defending forces may be symmetrically
treated as mere brigands regardless of how well-motivated and respectful
of the laws and customs of war their actions may have been.
These results are clearly inconsistent with the underlying even-
handed, humanitarian philosophy of the law of armed conflict and, in
practice, have been avoided by defending governments through various
expedients. During the Vietnam conflict, captured Viet Cong were given
prisoner of war treatment without regard to technical questions of status.
Arguably, prisoner of war status could have been denied these prisoners
on the basis of a strict application, with some modification, of the terms
of the 1949 Geneva POW Convention. Captured Viet Cong soldiers, other-
wise personally conforming to the laws and customs of war in the opera-
tion in which they were captured, were not considered responsible for the
violations of the laws and customs of war which appeared to the United
States to be part of the general mode of operation of the Viet Cong.2 7
The same pattern appears in the British grant of "political prisoner"
treatment to captured Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.) "terrorists" in
Northern Ireland despite the adamant British refusal to accord that sta-
tus.2 8 This pattern also supports the I.R.A. contention that some special
26. In The Prize Cases, note 1 supra, Justice Grier for a 5-4 majority denied the valid-
ity of the analogous labeling system that had been adopted by the federal authorities of the
United States during the Civil War, saying that soldiers of the United States on the battle-
field are not "executioners" killing criminals convicted of "treason." Id. at 673. Instead, he
argued that belligerent rights are being exercised on both sides. Id. at 669, 673-74. It was
only thirteen years after the Civil War had ended that the Supreme Court managed to rec-
oncile the labeling system adopted by the federal government with the facts, concluding
that "belligerent rights" were "conceded" to the Confederate forces by the Union "in the
interest of humanity, and to prevent the cruelties of reprisals and retaliation". Ford v.
Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 605 (1878).
27. Bond, Protection of Non-Combatants in Guerrilla Wars, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv.
77 (1971); thu UffICUI1 A .Uerican dire-uctive, Mity 'niste ComnwUId, Vietiami Direc-
tive 381-446: Criteria For Classification And Disposition of Detainees (Dec. 27, 1967), is
located at id. at 798 n.23.
28. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 512 (Eur. Ct.).
The arrest and detention arrangements are outlined at 590, but the whole report of the
European Commission of Human Rights is worth reading for the strained attempt by the
United Kingdom to picture its emergency regulations as simply a special part of the normal
criminal law. The Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (Jan. 18, 1978) out-
lines the interrogation and detention practices of the United Kingdom as if they were
merely emergency additions to the normal criminal law, and holds them to be in violation of
article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter cited as European Convention],
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political prisoner treatment is legally required, and that such treatment is
not a mere matter of grace by the British defenders of the status quo, but
rather a matter of the general application of humanitarian international
law. The utilization of special tribunals and detention facilities, and the
special treatment accorded to captured Palestinian "terrorists" by
Israel,2" and to Italy's "Red Brigade,"8 0 is further evidence of an underly-
ing humanitarian law. It would appear that many defending governments
confronted with "terrorism" feel the humanitarian tugs of the law of
armed conflict and the practical policy reasons that support that law
more strongly than they are willing, for political reasons, to admit."1
Arguably, the behavior of states and defending governments reflects,
as part of the lawmaking process, a series of political evaluations develop-
ing parallel to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. These evaluations may be
better suited to the realities of modern armed conflict than the legal cate-
gories established by the Conventions. The treatment accorded to cap-
tured "terrorists" in practice more closely conforms to the underlying
principles of humanitarian law than the Geneva formulation would re-
quire, and may spring from the same humanitarian roots as the formula-
tion. The formulation, however, remains unmodified, possibly reflecting
the statesmen's desire to reserve to themselves the legal discretion
asymetrically advantageous to defending governments under the present
treaty formulation.
Under the present formulation, the treatment accorded captured
"terrorists" is entirely a matter of the municipal law of the capturing
state as interpreted by the defending government, and if that government
decides to treat its captives below the minimum standards which the
Conventions would fix, that government merely denies the applicability of
the Conventions and the legal interest (standing) of any other state to
which states, "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." 1978 Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 602 (Eur. Ct.).
It is hard to see how the humanitarian treatment required by article 3 of the 1949
Geneva POW Convention would in any way be a higher standard than that already provided
to common criminals under the European Convention, and except for details regarding cor-
respondence and protecting power or Red Cross visitations, it is hard to find significant
differences between the European Court of Human Rights' interpretation of article 3 of the
European Convention and the elaborate protections for prisoners of war in international
armed conflicts under the 1949 Geneva POW Convention.
29. In the recent case involving Ziyad Abu Eain, the Government of Israel classified
Abu Eain as a common criminal and undertook to treat him as such in Israel if the United
States would extradite him to stand trial for a politically motivated bombing in Israel. This
departs from the normal Israeli practice with regard to accused "terrorists." See Eain v.
Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981); Department of State, Memorandum of Decision in the
Case of the Request by the State of Israel for the Extradition of Ziyad Abu Eain (Dec. 12,
1981) (furnished to the author by the Office of Sen. Dan Quayle); Rubin, Extradition of
Terrorists, 15 INT'L PRACTITIONER's NOTEBOOK 15 (1981).
30. S. Conti, Treatment of Terrorists in Italy (unpublished M.A.L.D. thesis, the Fletch-
er School of Law & Diplomacy) (in the files of the author, Florence, Italy).
31. Cf. R. TRINQUIER, MODERN WARFARE 20-25 (1964) (discussing the practical policy
arguments of the law).
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express a view. It can also deny that international law is in any way rele-
vant, thus rejecting the disinterested interposition of humanitarian orga-
nizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. Such
organizations may have purview over the application of the Conventions,
but none over the application of municipal criminal law to matters essen-
tially within the reservation of legal discretion. This discretion to treat
political "freedom fighters" or "terrorists" as if they were common
criminals is itself inconsistent with the fundamental object of the law it-
self: to minimize the impact of armed conflict on the helpless, whether or
not the conflict is of an international character.
IV. THE LATEST ATTEMPT AT CODIFICATION
From this standpoint, it is interesting to look at the 1977 Geneva
Protocols"2 as the latest expression of the international community which
formally addresses entitlement to prisoner of war status. Protocol I,
which addresses international armed conflicts, preserves the protection of
general international law outside of the conventional framework as it
might apply to captured irregulars. Article 1(2) states: "In cases not cov-
ered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles
of international law derived from established custom, from the principles
of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience."
To those who have followed the application of this language from its
inception as the so-called "de Martens clause" of the 1899 Hague Con-
vention"3 to the present, it is apparent that its direct effects are small.
32. Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/44 (1977) (entered into force Dec. 7,
1978) [hereinafter cited as Protocol IJ, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977), and D. ScHIN-
DLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 535; Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc.A/32/144
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Protocol II], reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977), and D. SCHIN-
DLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 619. Protocol I relates to the provisions of the 1949
Geneva Conventions applicable to international armed conflicts (so-called "Article 2 Con-
flicts"). Protocol II relates only to armed conflicts not of an international character (so-
called "Article 3 Conflicts"). The articles relate to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, all four of
which make the same distinctions. See note 19 supra. Article 1(2) of Protocol II specifically
excludes from its material field of application "situations of internal disturbances and ten-
sions. such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature,
as not being armed conflicts," thus leaving the asymmetrical regime of armed conflict not of
an international character essentially only to the nonisolated, nonsporadic violence in civil
wars that before 1949 was considered properly regulated by the symmetrical law of war. See
INT'L L. Ass'N (American Branch), note 19 supra.
33. 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, supra note 14, preambular para. 9 (1899) &
para. 8 (1907). De Martens was the Russian official usually considered responsible for the
language first appearing in the 1899 Hague Convention making it clear that the rules codi-
fied in its appended Regulations did not exhaust the field. The precise words of the "de
Martens clause" are:
. Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Con-
tracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regu-
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But it does leave open the possibility that the treatment of Viet Cong
guerrillas, I.R.A. "soldiers," P.L.O. "terrorists," "Red Brigade" members
and some other "freedom fighters" is part of the overall legal regulation
of armed conflict, and not mere political concessions by the defending
governments in anticipation of equivalent, merely political, concessions
by the guerrilla units capturing their own soldiers.
More directly, Protocol I addresses the legal asymmetry between de-
fending government forces and "terrorists" in its article 1(4), under which
the symmetrical rules of "armed conflict" should be applied in principle
to the following:
[a]rmed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the ex-
ercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter
of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."
This language, if unmodified, would appear to rectify to some extent
the asymmetry of the formal Geneva approach favoring the defending
forces by making it more difficult for the defending forces to avoid a legal
responsibility to give captive enemies, whose personal conduct conforms
to the humanitarian laws of war, prisoner of war treatment on the basis of
violations of the rules and customs of war by others. A very persuasive
argument can be made that this provision of Protocol I, coupled with the
Protocol's expanded specification of "grave breaches" in articles 11 and
85, would create a legal framework for the treatment of "freedom-fight-
ing" guerrillas. The framework would provide the needed symmetry of
legal rights and obligations and would satisfy the practical object of as-
suring maximum legal protection for the innocent victims of a conflict
(both as prisoners and as the object of attack-such attacks now being
defined themselves as "grave breaches" under article 85(3) of the
Protocol).
But the problem of auto-interpretation, of each party to the conflict
using the legal classification system to its own political advantage by sim-
ply asserting or denying the "colonial" or "racist" nature of the struggle,
would remain. The framers of Protocol I sought a further step to solve
that possibly unsolvable problem in an ingenious but equivalently asym-
metrical way. Article 96(2) provides that parties to the Protocol are
bound to its terms in an armed conflict "in relation to each of the Parties
lations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the pro-
tection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from
the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity,
and the requirements of the public conscience.
See Minch, Die Marten'sche Klausel und die Grundlagen des Valker-rechts, 36 ZMr-
SCHRIFT FOR AUSLXNDISCHES OFrENTLcIHEs RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 345 (1976).
34. Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 1(4).
1983
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
[to the conflict] which are not bound by it [the Protocol], if the latter
[i.e., a Party to the conflict which is not bound by the Protocol] accepts
and applies the provisions thereof."3' (emphasis added). The emphasized
phrase, "and applies," seems to be the reflection of the older formula-
tions restricting the entitlement to prisoner of war treatment to "mem-
bers of" those organizations (however defined) which "conduct their oper-
ations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.""' But it is here
that it is possible to see most clearly the inequities of the attempt at
symmetry. The symmetry is sought to be applied to organizations rather
than to individuals of honorable temper engaged in political violence.
Moreover, it is uncertain whether guerrillas, once their movement has
achieved the degree of success that brings into play the very notion of
applying the law of armed conflict to their struggle, will necessarily have
the control of territory and the infrastructure necessary to assure prisoner
of war treatment to captured defenders. To refuse to apply the laws of
armed conflict to participants in their movement until they do so is, in
the context of the Geneva framework, to withhold humanitarian protec-
tion from some more or less innocent victims of armed conflicts.
To argue that soldiers in a movement that is not yet sufficiently suc-
cessful to warrant the application of the law of armed conflict deserve no
treatment other than the humanitarian treatment which international law
prescribes for criminals, is to argue that well-motivated and honorable
individuals acting in conformity with the laws and customs of war may be
treated as ordinary criminals. The treatment prescribed for criminals is
essentially all that flows from classifying the conflict as one "not of an
international character" under article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions and Protocol II. It does not seem significantly different from
the legal protection owing to foreign soldiers in an armed conflict not
reaching the level of an article 2 conflict,37 or ordinary criminals under
various human rights rules of international law. It is difficult to under-
stand how such a system of classification supports respect for the laws
and customs of war, responds to social needs, or protects the individual
victims of armed conflict.
Article 96(3) of Protocol I states: "The authority representing a peo-
ple engaged against a High Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the
type referred to in Article I, paragraph 4, may undertake to apply the
Conventions and this Protocol in relation to that conflict by means of a
u i"Atera declaration addresed to the depositary."'
This language would seem to replace the existing auto-interpretation
pattern of international law that gives each actor in the international
35. Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 96(2).
36. 1874 Brussels Declaration, supra note 11, art. 9. See also 1899 and 1907 Hague
Regulations, supra note 11, art.1; 1949 Geneva POW Convention, supra note 20, art.
4(A)(2)(d).
37. See note 19 supra.
38. Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 96(3).
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scene the power to determine in the first instance what legal labels ought
to be attached to any situation, with a special power in the leaders of
"self-determination" struggles to determine what legal regime should ap-
ply to them. Since that legal power is not given to the equally successful
leaders of identical struggles that lack the self-determination motive and,
indeed, is not given to defending governments even in a self-determina-
tion struggle, the normal identity of rights among all parties to an armed
conflict, referred to in this discussion as "symmetry," is replaced with
special rights for the pure of heart. Of course, the leaders of anti-colonial
or anti-racist guerrilla organizations can be expected to exercise whatever
discretion the law allows them in ways designed to improve their political
or military position regardless of the facts as perceived by others. Thus it
would appear that the asymmetry of the 1949 Geneva approach favoring
existing governments is replaced in Protocol I by a double asymmetry
favoring some (but not all) guerrilla organizations. It is hard to see how
symmetry can be restored to the law when an asymmetry is replaced by a
more complicated reverse asymmetry.
If it were possible to suppress all guerrilla movements with minimal
disruption to the higher interests of the affected communities, or if all
guerrilla movements whose purported aim was to eliminate colonialism or
racism were fundamentally humane or capable of replacing an unjust re-
gime with one more just, then this legal manipulation giving one side an
advantage over the other might be desirable. Unfortunately, experience
has shown the contrary to be true. Some guerrilla movements express a
sense of national grievance that cannot be squelched. Some are ephem-
eral. To stack the rules of armed conflict in such a way that the defending
forces appear justified in treating all captive guerrillas as mere criminals
brings the law into contempt and fails to protect some victims of the con-
flict who, by all our rhetoric, deserve protection. Indeed, treating even the
deluded members of the ephemeral, so-called "national liberation" or
"justice" movements that are politically isolated, hopeless and merely an-
archistic, as criminals in the same sense as the leaders and members who
order or commit war crimes or "grave breaches," cannot be justified.
Furthermore, this confusion between politically motivated violence
and normal criminality is not only illogical, but also unnecessary to de-
fend the political order. Even accepting the law of war as applicable to
the lowest levels of political violence, the leaders and soldiers who commit
"grave breaches," (including the "grave breach" of targeting civilian
populations as such), can legally be subjected to condign punishment re-
gardless of their status or lack of status as prisoners of war. In fact, their
apprehension and punishment is easier if it is conceded that they are act-
ing in a general armed conflict subject to the Geneva system, rather than
if they are conceived as mere politically motivated criminals. The Geneva
system includes obligations on the High Contracting Parties to search for
and either bring before their own courts, or hand over to another con-
cerned party for trial, persons alleged to have committed such "grave
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breaches."'" Thus, where a "normal" criminal may escape from extradi-
tion under the terms of an extradition treaty that exempts "political of-
fenders," a soldier who commits a "grave breach" of the laws and customs
of war pursuant to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol 1, enjoys no
such exemption.
The technical approach of the 1949 Conventions and the 1977 Proto-
cols to the codification of the laws and customs of war as applied to guer-
rillas leads to these anomalous results, and thus seems ripe for reconsid-
eration. If a more realistic solution cannot be had through a multilateral
conference than through the slower but more sure route of state practices,
the assertion of law through international correspondence, public state-
ments, learned discussion and before national tribunals as envisaged in
article 45(2) of Protocol I should be used to develop the law of interna-
tional armed conflict.
V. SUMMARY
It may be seen from this brief survey of the Geneva system as ap-
plied in theory and practice to guerrilla-type "freedom-fighter" or "ter-
rorist" situations, that the current codifications and hopes for future
codifications of the law, in the short term, lead to a pattern of prescrip-
tion that is unsatisfactory from any point of view. If the codifications are
read technically as covering the entire field, treatment as a common crim-
inal is proper for even well-motivated and honorable guerrilla fighters,
and pleas for better treatment of defending soldiers are unlikely to be
persuasive. This situation seems inconsistent with the basic idea of hu-
manitarian law: protecting the victims of armed conflict. As exemplified
by the American, British, Israeli and Italian treatment of captured "ter-
rorists," the Geneva system also seems too narrow to describe the real
apprehensions of law. It is, at least, too narrow to describe the policies
that enlightened and humane states in general are likely to conclude
would be wise in the interests of humanity, eventual reconciliation and
peace, and reciprocity. The growth of this practice is part of the law-mak-
ing process of the international legal order and should be encouraged by
highlighting its legal underpinnings and law-making implications.
This plea for a broader conception of the laws of armed conflict as
applied to "national liberation freedom fighter" situations rather than the
1~~ f- :.. +ik- t~.ar alya+m i al ~arlV im.tech"Ich ir t-rpretations p.. - r' in- t had1,i1, ... --. m.. e, ste o m  eas- --.- , y -
plicit in part of Protocol I. Article 44(3) of that Protocol recognizes that
there are situations in armed conflicts where, "owing to the nature of the
hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself [from the
civilian population], he shall retain his status as a combatant provided
that. .. he carries his arms openly. . . during each military engagement,
and . . . during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is
39. 1949 Geneva POW Convention, supra note 20, art. 129.
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engaged in a military deployment . ...',o Indeed, even combatants who
fail to meet these requirements, although deprived of prisoner of war sta-
tus by article 44(4), are by the same article, "given protections equivalent
in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war . . ".., Surely these
provisions are evidence of the irreconcilable conflict between those who
would lower the threshold of prisoner of war entitlement to admit all po-
litically motivated "soldiers" and those who would treat all irregulars as
bandits until the armed conflict took on more nearly, the form of Euro-
pean wars of the nineteenth century.
In drafting Protocol I, the twentieth-century humanitarians obvi-
ously won, as treatment as prisoners of war is the essence of the prescrip-
tion, subject to an expanded "grave breaches" conception and the re-
moval of soldiers' privileges from guerrillas who masquerade as civilians
during deployment. The result is to authorize the capturing power to con-
demn as common criminals, rather than as war criminals, those guerrillas
who target civilians or masquerade during deployment. Nevertheless, the
Protocol treats as legitimate soldiers those combatants who, by disguising
themselves as civilians at other times, lead the defending forces to target
people who appear to be civilians. But even this strange victory for hu-
manitarians is eviscerated by the provisions discussed above, by which
the best contemporary classifying minds have made these prescriptions
inoperative in their entirety until the "freedom-fighting" or "terrorist"
organization decides it is in its own interest to have them apply. Rather
than attempt further to disentangle the skein, it is best at this point to
indicate simply that article 44(3), and possibly article 44(4), appear to be
steps towards codifying a more humane and logical approach. They also
constitute further evidence that the Geneva system for bringing into play
the conception of prisoner of war treatment for "freedom fighters" is in-
complete and does not fully take account of the realities or perceptions of
wise legal policy, or even what is arguably already existing international
law.
It was noted above that U. S. tribunals in practice already apply
something like the terms of article 45(2) of Protocol I in permitting an
accused criminal to allege his entitlement to prisoner of war status and to
hear argument on the merits of the allegation. An attempt to use that
practice was made by William Guillermo Morales, whose argument was
rejected by Eugene H. Nickerson, District Judge for the Southern District
of New York, in U.S. v. Morales.4 2 Morales claimed that as an associate of
the Armed Forces of the Puerto Rican National Liberation (FALN) he
was entitled, when captured after nearly killing himself making explo-
sives, to be treated as a prisoner of war. It appears he believed that such a
plea, if accepted by the court, would result in his being turned over to
U.S. military authorities for detention until he could be removed to a
40. Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 44(3).
41. Id. art. 44(4).
42. U.S. v. Morales, 464 F. Supp. 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
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neutral country for the duration of the conflict. Judge Nickerson did not
address that patently erroneous legal conclusion, but held that the defen-
dant had not clearly alleged his own membership in the FALN, thus de-
nying the claim on the preliminary question of pleading.
The case is interesting for two reasons. First, it reveals the patent
misconception that some lawyers and self-styled "freedom-fighters" seem
to have as to the privileges of soldiers (the FALN as an organization
seems to have ordered "grave breaches" to be committed), and the legal
results of acquiring prisoner of war status. Second, it raises the question
of eventual release.
In the language of the 1949 Geneva POW Convention, "[pirisoners of
war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of
active hostilities.""' It is ancient practice to allow a prisoner of war his
liberty on "parole" if he undertakes to avoid further involvement in the
conflict." But ordinary criminals presumably serve a fixed time reduced
by parole or other considerations independent of national or international
politics. Thus, the internment of a prisoner of war may be longer or
shorter than that of the same person labeled a mere criminal. The factors
that determine the length of the incarceration are wholly different. In the
Morales case, would the interests of society in having Morales removed
from a political struggle in which he has been taking an active and violent
role be better served by classifying his status as a "prisoner of war" or as
a "criminal"? Would his release after three years as an unauthorized pos-
sessor of dangerous weapons meet the needs of society to remove him
from our midst while he is fanatically convinced of the virtues of his po-
litical position? Would twenty years be appropriate, when the armed
struggle could collapse within two years by the acceptance of FALN par-
ticipation in a Puerto Rican Government and the redirection of FALN
energies, assuming that Morales is in fact no danger to society outside of
the FALN political context?
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It would seem that a basic conception of the modern codification of
the laws of war was the sharp distinction between organized soldiery and
civilians, with an exception made for leves en masse, to be entitled to
soldiers' privileges. With the legitimation of underground and partisan
guerrilla warfare during the Second World War, the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions replaced that sharp distinction with a much more elaborate set Of
rules. The application of these rules, however, is withheld until the par-
ties concerned classify the conflict as "international." In retrospect it ap-
pears to have been the intention of the statesmen involved to give
soldiers' privileges to partisan remnants of defeated national armies, but
withhold those privileges from guerrillas engaged in struggles against co-
43. 1949 Geneva POW Convention, supra note 17, art. 118.
44. See Lieber Code, supra note 7, arts. 119-30.
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lonial regimes. The asymmetries that resulted have been ameliorated to a
considerable extent by the practice of states extending to guerrillas in
noninternational armed conflicts something quite close to the special
treatment that they would be entitled to if the conflict were international.
There is a question as to whether that special treatment is given as of
grace through the normal criminal law system of the defending govern-
ment, as all defending governments claim for their own position, or as a
manifestation of an underlying opinio juris that well-motivated and hon-
orable guerrillas individually observing the laws and customs of war are
entitled to soldiers' privileges.
Attempts to bring the Conventions' regime closer to current reality in
1977 ended by increasing the elaboration and asymmetries inherent in the
1949 regime. It may be suggested that the elaboration of humanitarian
legal protection for common criminals and for participants in armed con-
flicts not of an international character is slowly making irrelevant the le-
gal categories negotiated by statesmen in disregard of principle and
reality.4 5
45. Some of these ideas are explored further in Rubin, Terrorism, "Grave Breaches"
and the 1977 Geneva Protocols, 74 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 192-96, 209-10 (1980-1981).
During the discussion that followed the reading of the papers, the question was posed as to
just how low a threshold should be taken as the point at which the law of armed conflict
might usefully be applied to political violence. This author responded that there was no
clear ultimate limit. More recently, while expounding the same idea at Washington and Lee
School of Law, the author was asked if the law of armed conflict should be applied to Ku
Klux Klan members killing Communist Worker's Party demonstrators. In light of the jury
verdict of not guilty in an extreme case in Greensboro, North Carolina, on November 17,
1980 (N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1980, at 1, col. 2), this author had no difficulty in answering in
the affirmative. Under the law of armed conflict, the "soldiers" of the Klan would have been
imprisoned as "prisoners of war" until they conceded the end of the hostilities, presumably
for life, and might well have been tried by court martial for the war crimes involved in their
shooting an "enemy" that was not obstructing their achieving any rational military goal.
Even releasing them on parole would have been more sensible and realistic than trying them
for murder and acquitting them.
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